Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: A Sign From Above in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence by Richardson, Christine Mary
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 46 
Issue 1 Fall 1996 Article 9 
1996 
Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: A Sign From 
Above in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Christine Mary Richardson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Christine M. Richardson, Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: A Sign From Above in 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 285 (1997). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss1/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY
BOARD v. PINETTE: A SIGN FROM
ABOVE IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits Congress,
as well as the states, from enacting any law respecting an establishment of
religion.' This Clause not only proscribes government from instituting a
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "). The exact meaning of the Establishment Clause is a matter of interpreta-
tion. Some scholars believe that it only prevents the government from establishing an offi-
cial state church. See generally ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); Michael W. McConnell, Accommoda-
tion of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Others argue that it means that the government
should simply remain neutral toward religion. See generally Philip B. Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
See also Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A proper
respect for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue
a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that the government must remain neutral toward reli-
gion in order to prevent the type of government involvement in religious life that tends to
"lead to strife and frequently strain a political system"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that the Establishment Clause prevents the government from
aiding or proscribing religion).
The original intent of the Establishment Clause has been the cause of much contention.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80-81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the intent of the Framers regarding the meaning of the Establishment Clause is "un-
clear"); id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Establishment Clause was
designed to prevent the creation of a national religion and not to construct an absolute wall
of separation between church and state); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 112-45 (2d ed. 1994) (criticizing the view
that the Framers intended to allow governmental aid to religion on a nonpreferential ba-
sis). For a discussion on the role of original intent in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158 (2d ed. 1988).
The First Amendment Establishment Clause is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8; Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
See generally LEVY, supra, at 224-34. Levy discusses the ongoing debate among legal
scholars regarding the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. He takes the approach that the Supreme Court
will never "scrap" the incorporation doctrine, and criticizes others for asserting that the
doctrine has "shaky foundations" in relation to the First Amendment's application to the
states. Id. at 226.
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church, or passing laws that purposely benefit religion;2 it also prohibits
government from endorsing any religion.3 The First Amendment also
forbids Congress from inhibiting the free flow of religious speech.4 An
inherent conflict arising out of the First Amendment exists between the
establishment prohibition and an individual's rights of Free Exercise of
Religion and Free Speech.'
Still, the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental distinction be-
tween government speech endorsing religion and private speech endors-
ing religion.6 Although government may not engage in speech endorsing
religion, the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses firmly protect the
right of private individuals to do so.' The Court further has determined
2. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. In Everson, the Court stated that:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or dis-
beliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
gion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, partici-
pate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Id. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-14, at 1276 (discussing specific prohibitions on
government with regard to religion).
3. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-15 (discussing govern-
ment endorsement of religion). The Court includes in its definition of endorsement such
terms as "favoritism," "preferred," and "promotion." County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (utilizing the terms "favored" and
"preferred" to define endorsement); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (using
the term "preference"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
government may neither favor nor prefer religion); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968) (noting that the government may not promote religion and must remain neutral).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.").
5. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-70;
see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION: A DELICATE
BALANCE (Sept. 1993) (discussing cases in which the conflict between the Establishment
and Free Expression Clauses have arisen); TRIBE, supra note 1. § 14-2, at 1157 (discussing
the tension between the two clauses).
6. Accord Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522-
23 (1995); see Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (finding that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect");
M.G. "Pat" Robertson, Squeezing Religion Out of the Public Square-The Supreme Court,
Lemon, and the Myth of the Secular Society, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 241-43
(1995) (discussing Mergens).
7. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522-23; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250; TRIBE, supra note
1, § 14-5, at 1167-68 & n.14 (discussing government accommodation of religion as man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause).
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that while government may not endorse religion, neutral policies that
provide incidental benefits to religion do not constitute endorsement and,
therefore, do not violate the Establishment Clause.8
Private religious speech is protected as secular, private expression by
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.9 Therefore, neutral policies
that permit individuals to express publicly their beliefs, do not violate the.
Establishment Clause.1" Still, the right of an individual to conduct this
speech on government property is not absolute. 1 Rather, the right to
conduct private speech on government property may be curtailed de-
8. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988) (holding that the Adolescent
Family Life Act, which provided unconditional grants to institutions, including religious
institutions, for teenage sexuality counseling, did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, and did not create excessive entanglement with religion); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-89 (1986) (finding no violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause where funds that were part of a state vocational aid program might
eventually go to religious institutions as a result of an aid recipient's private choice);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,271-74 (1981) (finding no Establishment Clause violation
where religious student groups received an incidental benefit of access to university facili-
ties through a neutral access policy); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445, 449 (1961)
(finding that Sunday closing laws afforded only an incidental benefit to religion where the
state had a secular interest in providing a "uniform day of rest for all citizens"). But see
Committee for Pub. Educ. of Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (hold-
ing a New York statute that granted financial assistance to non-public schools in violation
of the Establishment Clause because of its "primary effect" of advancing religion).
9. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94
(1993) (holding that the government violates the First Amendment when it attempts to
preclude speech based on the viewpoint that speech asserts); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250
(finding that the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect private religious speech);
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (finding that the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses limit the
state's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (noting that the state agreed that
dissemination of religious materials was protected by the First Amendment).
10. See supra note 8 (citing Supreme Court cases involving incidental benefits to reli-
gion and finding no Establishment Clause violation).
11. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
(asserting that the First Amendment does not mandate equal access to all areas of school
property merely because some type of communication occurs there).
1996]
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pending on whether the land is classified as a public forum,'12 limited pub-
lic forum,' 3 or non-public forum.14
The Supreme Court has held that a state may not impose a content-
based restriction' 5 on private speech in a public forum unless the restric-
tion is essential to further a "compelling state interest" and is tailored
toward attaining that goal. 16 Additionally, the Court has recognized that
12. See id. at 45 (defining a public forum as a "place[ ] which by long tradition or by
government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (finding the purpose of a tradi-
tional public forum to be the "free exchange of ideas"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 & n.5
(finding that a public university campus has characteristics similar to a public forum); see
also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. C.
REv. 1, 29 (discussing First Amendment protection afforded to speech when the streets are
used as public fora).
13. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990) (noting that the Equal
Access Act states that a limited public forum is created whenever a public secondary
school allows "one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school prem-
ises during noninstructional time") (citation omitted); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 817 (Black-
mun & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (defining limited public forum as "government property
which the government has opened for use as a place for expressive activity for a limited
amount of time, or for a limited class of speakers, or for a limited number of topics")
(citations omitted).
14. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819 (defining a non-public forum as "property that is not
compatible with general expressive activity"). In Cornelius, the Court found that
"[clontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker
identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Id. at 806.
Time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are valid if they are "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and ... they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984); see also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48.
15. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (finding the exclusion of
speech with religious content from a public forum to be a content-based exclusion); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First Amend-
ment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (interpreting the First Amendment to restrict the govern-
ment's power to curtail private speech based on "its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content"); see also Kalven, supra note 12, at 22 (regarding content-based restrictions
as forms of censorship); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 199 (1983) ("[C]ontent-based restrictions attempt substan-
tially to eliminate particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information from public debate
and thus undermine the values and purposes underlying the first amendment.").
16. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 ("Because a principal purpose of traditional public
fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when
the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest."). In Cornelius, the Court upheld restrictions on charity
solicitation in the federal work place. See id. at 813. The Court found the relevant forum
to be non-public. See id. at 806. As a result of this finding, the government's access restric-
tion need only have been reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See id. The Court concluded
that the government's restriction was reasonable because it sought to prevent disruption in
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a state may have a compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation.' 7 The Court has not sanctioned this interest, however,
where there was "no realistic danger" of government endorsement of
religion or where the benefit provided to religion was "merely
incidental."'"
The Supreme Court has utilized two methods of analysis when deter-
mining whether a realistic danger of an Establishment Clause violation
exists. 19 Under the first method of analysis, the endorsement test, a gov-
ernment statute or policy will be invalid if it endorses religion.20 Whether
a statute or policy endorses religion is directly related to the message the
display conveys.2' The primary focus of this analysis is on the observer's
reasonable perception of the purpose of the display.22 Furthermore, this
the work place, to aid successful fund-raising efforts, and to avoid sending a message of
political favoritism. See id. at 813; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 ("For the state to enforce a
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."). Once again, the Court
found that the relevant forum was non-public and that the government restrictions were
"reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum ... serve[d]." I. at 49; cf. Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460, 465 (1980) (finding a prohibition on picketing in residential
neighborhoods and in public streets and sidewalks to be an unreasonable restriction on
speech). See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-3 (discussing application of the compelling
state interest test in relevant Free Exercise cases).
17. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)
(finding no actual implication of a compelling state interest where film with religious con-
tent would be shown after school hours, would not be sponsored by the school, and would
be accessible to the public); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (finding no actual implication of a
compelling state interest where religious student groups merely were given equal access to
state university facilities).
18. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause
where equal facility access had the incidental effect of conferring a benefit upon a religious
group); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-74 (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause
where religious groups received an incidental benefit of facility access).
19. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592,
601-02 (1989) (adopting the endorsement test); Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983) (applying public forum analysis); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-
70 (applying public forum analysis).
20. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595. The Court adopted the endorsement test
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94
(1984). See id. Endorsement of religion violates the Establishment Clause because it com-
municates "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. For criticism of the
endorsement test, see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 115, 147-51 (1992). McConnell asserts that the term "endorsement" is not
definable and, therefore, offers no assistance to lower courts in deciding Establishment
Clause cases. See id. at 148-49.
21. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595.
22. See id. ("The question is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display."') (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692).
19961
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perception necessarily depends upon the "context"23 or "particular physi-
cal setting '24 of the display. If a "reasonable observer" would perceive
that certain speech effectively endorses religion, then the Establishment
Clause is violated, and the speech may be proscribed.25
The second method of analysis utilized by the Supreme Court, public
forum analysis, involves determining whether private religious expression
on state-owned property violates the Establishment Clause by having the
effect of endorsing religion.26 The effect greatly depends on whether the
property traditionally has been used as a public forum. 27 For example,
the Establishment Clause is not violated when religious student groups
23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. Lynch left unclear whether "context" meant physical con-
text or the town's attempt at a secular celebration of Christmas. See TRIBE, supra note 1,
§ 14-15, at 1291-92 & nn.54-55. In Lynch, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a
creche in the center of the shopping district. See 465 U.S. at 671. The display of the
creche, surrounded by a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a sign reading "Seasons
Greetings," was found not to have the effect of endorsing religion. See id. at 685-86.
24. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595. In Allegheny County, the Court focused on the
setting of the creche, and held that the creche, unaccompanied by any secular objects,
violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at 595, 620; LEVY, supra note 1, at 207-08 (dis-
cussing the context approach taken in Allegheny County). The Court also considered a
display of a privately-owned menorah in front of the City-County Building. See Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 587. Justice Blackmun focused on the City's celebration of cultural
diversity in determining that no Establishment Clause violation had occurred. See id. at
619. Furthermore, in Allegheny County, Justice Blackmun cited Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion in Lynch regarding the focus on the context of a display and endorsement of religion.
See id. at 595. "'[A] typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content
of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content."' Id. (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692).
25. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595
(1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690; see also TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-15, at 1292-94 (discussing
Lynch and stating that the endorsement test should be applied from the standpoint of a
"reasonable non-adherent").
26. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813-
22 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981). For a discussion
of public forum analysis in general, see TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-24, at 986-97. Although
Professor Tribe criticizes public forum analysis, a plurality of the Court seems to find it
useful in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450 (1995) (holding that private religious, symbolic expres-
sion in a traditional public forum, accessible to all citizens on a non-discriminatory basis,
does not violate the Establishment Clause); see also GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST
FREEDOM: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER 104-06
(1993) (arguing that the Court's public forum analysis is confusing and provides little gui-
dance to the lower courts).
27. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808 (restricting speech where a non-public forum was
found to exist); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (restricting speech in a limited public forum);
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (invalidating a restriction where a public forum was found to
exist). For criticism of the public forum analysis, see Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984).
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conduct meetings at state university facilities if the university has a policy
of making its facilities open to all registered student groups.2" Allowing
registered religious groups equal access to the facilities would not have
the "primary effect" of advancing religion. 9 Unfortunately, the lower
courts have reached conflicting conclusions when applying this analysis.3"
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict in Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.3'
In Capitol Square, the Ku Klux Klan (Klan) applied to the Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board (Board) for permission to erect an
unattended Latin cross on the grounds of the Ohio Statehouse during the
Christmas season.32 This land had been used as a public forum for over
one hundred years.33 In addition, Capitol Square had hosted several
state and privately-sponsored unattended displays.34 The Board, how-
ever, denied the Klan's application, citing its desire to comply with the
Ohio and United States Constitutions, both of which prohibit the estab-
lishment of religion.35
28. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
29. Id. at 275.
30. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious symbol
was displayed on state property traditionally used as a public forum); Kreisner v. City of
San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no violation of the Establishment
Clause where private religious display was erected in a park used as a traditional public
forum), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994); Americans United for Separation of Church and
State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1545-46 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding no
violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious display was erected on city
property traditionally used as a public forum); Flamer v. City of White Plains, 841 F. Supp.
1365, 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause where no
reasonable observer would perceive a government endorsement of religion if a private
religious display were erected in a public forum). But see Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City
of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding a violation of the
Establishment Clause where a private religious display was erected in a city park tradition-
ally used as a public forum); Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 958-59 (4th Cir.
1990) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious symbol
was displayed on county property designated as a public forum); Kaplan v. City of Burling-
ton, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause
where a private religious display was permitted in a traditional public forum).
31. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
32. See id. at 2444-45. The Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board regulates pub-
lic activity in the Square. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 105.41 (Anderson 1994 & Supp.
1995). The Ohio legislature designated the Square as accessible by the public "for free
discussion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose." OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 128-4-02(A) (1995).
33. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 2445; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion .... ). The Ohio Constitution provides "No person
shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form
19961
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Unable to obtain administrative relief, the Klan filed for an injunction
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.36
The district court granted the injunction, finding that Capitol Square was
a traditional public forum, accessible to everyone and lacking any
prohibitions on unattended exhibitions.3 7 The Board's request for an
emergency stay was denied,38 and the Klan proceeded to erect the
cross.39 The Board then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling under the
same analysis.4n
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that private religious
expression, in the form of an unattended religious display, located at the
seat of government on public property traditionally used as a public fo-
rum, did not violate the Establishment Clause.41 In finding no Establish-
ment Clause violation, the Court also rejected the Board's compelling
state interest argument.4 2 Perhaps the most interesting facet of the hold-
ing was the method of analysis the Court elected to use in reaching its
decision.4 3 Although the Board urged the Court to apply the endorse-
ment test, a plurality of the Court declined to do so where the expression
of worship against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious
society; nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted." OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 7.
36. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. Vincent Pinette, leader of the Ohio chapter
of the Klan, applied on behalf of the group. See. id.
37. See id. The district court further found that the Klan's expression was private and,
therefore, protected by the First Amendment. See id. Finally, the district court held that
the state did not establish that such a display could reasonably be regarded as government
endorsement of religion. See id.
38. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 114 S. Ct. 626 (1993)
(Stevens, J., in chambers).
39. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
40. See Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995), affd 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). In affirming the
district court's ruling, the court of appeals reaffirmed its judgment in Americans United for
Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (en
banc). See Pinette, 30 F.3d at 679. In Americans United, the Court held that "truly private
religious expression in a truly public forum cannot be seen as endorsement by a reasonable
observer." Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1553.
41. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450. The Court first stated that it would not
consider the Klan's claim of a freedom of speech violation based on the possibility that the
state denied the Klan's application because of the Klan's political viewpoints. See id. at
2445. The Court declared that it would consider.only the Establishment Clause claim be-
cause that was the question upon which certiorari was granted. See id
42. See id. at 2446-47.
43. See id. at 2444. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer with respect to
parts I, II, and III. See id. The Court was split severely, however, as to the method of
analysis used to reach its decision. See id at 2444-63.
1996] Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 293
was not that of the government, or where the government was not exhib-
iting favoritism toward private religious expression." Instead, the plural-
ity adopted a public forum exception to the endorsement test.45
Justice Thomas concurred with the plurality, but stated that the Klan's
cross, due to the Klan's history of cross-burning as a form of intimidation,
was more a political statement than a religious one.46 Justice Thomas was
skeptical that the Establishment Clause issue was even the real issue in
this case.47
Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter concurred jointly and separately
in the judgment, but disagreed with the plurality's refusal to apply the
endorsement test. 8 According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement
test was the proper test to apply to government policies that permitted
private religious expression on state property.49 Justice Souter asserted
that the endorsement test offered a better framework for examining Es-
tablishment Clause challenges than public forum analysis because public
44. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality in part IV of the opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. See id. at 2447-50.
45. See id. at 2450. The Court stated in its exception, "Religious expression cannot
violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a tradi-
tional public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Id.; see infra
notes 159-79 and accompanying text (discussing the public forum exception to the endorse-
ment test).
46. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
noted that the Klan traditionally had used "the cross... [as] a symbol of white supremacy
and a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics, Jews, Com-
munists, and any other groups hated by the Klan." Id.
47. See id. at 2451. Justice Thomas suggested that the true issue involved was perhaps
the right to Freedom of Speech rather than a potential Establishment Clause violation. See
id. at 2450-51.
48. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. See id. In Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion, "'[T]he endorsement test asks the right question about governmental practices chal-
lenged on Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the
display of religious symbols ...... Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
49. See id. Justice O'Connor stated that "an impermissible message of endorsement
can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which involve direct government speech or
outright favoritism." Id. at 2452.
For criticisms of the Lemon test and the endorsement test, see Robertson, supra note 6,
at 235-57. The Lemon test arose from the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). The test requires that for a government policy or statute to survive Establishment
Clause scrutiny, it must have a secular legislative purpose; it must not have the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and, it must not involve "excessive government
entanglement with religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Robertson argues that the
Lemon and endorsement tests are not neutral to religion and result in great inconsistencies
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 235-57.
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forum analysis did not take into consideration the effect of government
endorsement of private religious activity on public property. 50
Two Justices dissented. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that
regardless of the presence of a disclaimer, by allowing an unattended,
private, religious symbol to be displayed on government property, the
government necessarily endorsed religion, and, therefore, violated the
Establishment Clause. 1 Justice Stevens further stated that the endorse-
ment test should be applied to private, religious, symbolic expression ex-
hibited on government property.5 2 Justice Ginsburg also dissented,
finding that the display of an unattended religious symbol did not serve
the true goal of the Establishment Clause: the separation of church and
state.53
This Note examines the uneasy conflict between the prohibition against
government endorsement of religion and an individual's rights to free
speech and free expression of religious beliefs. This Note first explores
the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, focusing espe-
cially on private religious expression. Next, this Note analyzes differing
opinions the Justices asserted in Capitol Square, and argues that the plu-
rality opinion provides a necessary clarification for lower courts regarding
proper application of the endorsement test. This Note further states that
the public forum analysis espoused by the plurality supplies the proper
framework for evaluating private religious expression in the public arena
because it provides private citizens engaged in religious speech with the
same rights as private citizens engaged in non-religious speech. This Note
concludes that, in the future, public forum analysis will provide the great-
est protection for the First Amendment Rights of Free Expression of
Religion and Free Speech because it allows private religious speech the
same access to public forums as other forms of speech.
50. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2458, 2461 (Souter, J., concurring). Additionally,
Justice Souter agreed with the judgment because of the possibility of posting a government
disclaimer with the cross, thereby preventing any misperception of government endorse-
ment. See id. Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined in Justice Souter's concurrence. See
id. at 2457.
51. See id. at 2469 & n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "When the message is religious in
character, it is a message the state can neither send nor reinforce without violating the
Establishment Clause. Accordingly, I would hold that the Constitution generally forbids
the placement of a symbol of a religious character in, on, or before a seat of government."
Id. at 2469.
52. See id. at 2471. Justice Stevens stated that the display violated the Establishment
Clause because "the installation of the religious symbols in Capitol Square quite obviously
... 'ha[d] the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion'; indeed, no
other effect [was] ... even suggested by the record." Id.
53. See id. at 2474-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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I. TRADITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Recognition of a Compelling State Interest: Thou Shalt Not Violate
the Establishment Clause
To impose content-based restrictions on private speech in a public fo-
rum, a state must show that the restrictions are narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest. 4 In the past, the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that the states have a compelling interest in avoiding an Es-
tablishment Clause violation;55 however, the Court has refused to
recognize the implication of this interest where there is no danger of gov-
ernment endorsement of religion. 6
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has rejected a compelling state inter-
est claim where a content-neutral policy has bestowed an "incidental"
benefit upon religious speech. 7 In the context of public forum analysis,
the Court has determined that the Establishment Clause is not violated
where private individuals "take advantage of" content-neutral policies
which incidentally permit private religious speech in public forums.5 The
Supreme Court has relied on several factors in rejecting a state's compel-
ling state interest claim. The Court has considered relevant the fact that
the religious expression is not state-sponsored, 9 that the government
property in question is generally open to the public for the purpose of
54. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
("For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end."); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) ("[T]hough we might agree that certain
state interests may be so compelling that where no adequate alternatives exist a content-
based distinction-if narrowly drawn-would be a permissible way of furthering those
objectives, this is not such a case.") (citation omitted). For a discussion of the compelling
state interest test, see IVERS, supra note 26, at 158. Ivers discusses the adoption and imple-
mentation of this test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See id.
55. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391
(1993) (agreeing generally with the Church's argument and stating that "subject matter...
exclusions on District property were required to be justified by a compelling state interest
and to be narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271
(1981) ("[Tlhe interest of the University in complying with its constitutional obligations
may be characterized as compelling.").
56. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75.
57. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.
L. Rnv. 1, 9-14 (1986); Stone, supra note 15, at 189-94, 233-52.
58. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing public forum analysis and
its application).
59. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
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conducting free expression,6° and lastly, that the application process for
access is the same for all private parties.6'
For example, in two cases, the Supreme Court recognized the avoid-
ance of an Establishment Clause violation as a compelling state interest;62
however, in examining the relevant factors, the Court rejected the argu-
ments and found no danger of a violation. In Widmar v. Vincent,63 the
Court found that the University of Missouri at Kansas City had created a
"generally public forum" by adopting a policy of allowing any registered
student group to conduct activities at its facilities. 64 The denial of a regis-
tered student religious group from the public forum required that the
state show a compelling interest for its content-based restriction.6 Here,
the Court rejected the state's compelling interest claim because any bene-
fit conferred upon religion by the university's content-neutral policy
would be "incidental," and there was simply no threat of an Establish-
ment Clause violation.'
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,67 the
Court found that a rule promulgated by the school district to impose con-
tent-based restrictions on private religious groups by denying them facil-
ity access was unconstitutional in its application.68 The Court held that
the rule violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because
it was not viewpoint neutral.69 Once again, the Court recognized as com-
pelling the state's interest in averting an Establishment Clause viola-
60. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, 274. Public forum
analysis has been criticized as being an "inexact and confusing process," due to the alleged
difficulty in determining a traditional public forum from a limited public forum and non-
public forum. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Lamb's Chapel Revisited: A Mixed Message on
Establishment of Religion, Forum and Free Speech, 101 EDuc. L. REP. 531, 543 (1995).
61. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-71.
62. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
63. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
64. Id. at 267-69. The University denied access to a registered student religious group
based on a school regulation prohibiting the use of its facilities for religious worship or
teaching. See id. at 266-67.
65. See id. at 270. The university recognized over 100 student groups. See id. at 274.
The Court found that the availability of benefits to such a large variety of people greatly
secularized the potential effect of endorsement. See id.
66. See id. at 274-75. The Court stated that "an open forum in a public university does
not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." Id. at 274.
67. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
68. See id. at 393. In Lamb's Chapel, the school district adopted rules and regulations
pertaining to the use of school property for non-school-related activities. See id. at 386.
Rule 7 prohibited the use of school facilities for religious activities. See id.
69. See id. at 394; see also Stone, supra note 15, at 189 (asserting that content-neutral
restrictions limit expression regardless of the message). Such restrictions include, for ex-
ample, noise restriction laws, certain licensing requirements for public demonstrations, or
regulations regarding dissemination of pamphlets in public places. See id. at 189-90.
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tion.7° Nevertheless, the Court found that any benefit to religion would
be merely "incidental," and that the risk of an Establishment Clause vio-
lation was not implicated.7'
B. The Endorsement Test: In a State of Purgatory
The Supreme Court has developed several analytical frameworks for
determining whether government action advances religion, and thus vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. One of these frameworks is a three-
prong test, which examines the potential for government endorsement of
religion.72 The Lemon test dictates that for a government statute or pol-
icy to satisfy Establishment Clause requirements it must be secular in
purpose, it must not promote or constrain religion, and it must not re-
quire a substantial amount of government involvement in religion.73
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,71 the Supreme Court held that state statutes
that granted additional monetary compensation to teachers of non-reli-
gious subjects in parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause.75
The Court found that the statute resulted in excessive church and state
entanglement because the state would be obligated to monitor the activi-
ties of the teachers to ensure that the classes taught were strictly
secular.76
70. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
71. See id. at 395.
72. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
73. See id. The test states that the statute or policy first "must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion."' Id. (citation omitted). The Court adopted this three-part test from two
previous cases: Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968).
The purpose prong of the Lemon test does not prohibit a religious purpose or motiva-
tion for a law. There must be, however, some legitimate secular reason for the law. See
BARRY LYNN ET AL., THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3 (1995). Furthermore, the fact
that a law has an effect of advancing religion does not violate the Establishment Clause.
See id. The law must have the "primary effect" of advancing religion for there to be a
violation. Id. Finally, a law which requires some entanglement with religion will not vio-
late the Establishment Clause unless the entanglement is excessive. See id. In determining
whether the entanglement is excessive, courts will examine "the nature of (1) the aid pro-
vided, (2) the institution receiving the aid, and (3) the resulting relationship between that
institution and the government." Id.; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
74. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
75. See id. at 615-22.
76. See id. at 619, 621. The Court found that "[in the absence of precisely stated
constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' Id. at 612
(quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
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Lynch v. Donnelly77 provides one example of the Court's application of
the Lemon test.78 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that
the city of Pawtucket's display of a creche in the center of the shopping
district did not violate the Establishment Clause79 because the creche was
displayed along with secular holiday paraphernalia.8°  Although the
Court stated its reluctance to be constrained by the rigid Lemon test,81 it
still applied the test.82 In applying the test, however, the Court focused
primarily on the city's religious display "in the proper context of" the
holiday season.83 In so doing, the Court found that the city's display of
the creche did not endorse religion, nor did it bestow anything more than
an "incidental" benefit upon religion.' Unfortunately, the Court never
clearly stated what it meant by "in the context of," nor did it explain why
this benefit was merely "incidental., 85 Justice O'Connor concurred in the
Further, the Court noted that the Rhode Island statute violated the entanglement prong
because of the uncertainty that parochial school teachers would not incorporate religious
messages into their non-religious classes for which state aid was granted. See id. at 619. To
ensure that the teachers did not teach religion during secular classes, the state would have
to monitor the classes, thus fostering excessive entanglement. See id.
The Court found that the Pennsylvania statute resulted in excessive entanglement with
religion, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. See id. at 620-21. The Pennsylvania
program, which was similar to Rhode Island's, would also require state monitoring of paro-
chial school classes. See id. The Pennsylvania statute further violated the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test because it provided direct financial aid to parochial schools. See
id. at 621. In previous state aid cases involving possible Establishment Clause violations,
the Court refused to find violations where the aid went to the parents choosing parochial
schools for their children's education, rather than going directly to the schools. See id.
For criticisms of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, see Phillip E. Johnson, Con-
cepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 829-31
(1984). Johnson asserts that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test actually fosters
"divisiveness" among the public because the public is reluctant to adhere to rigid, judi-
cially-imposed constitutional principles in everyday life. Id. at 829.
77. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
78. See id. at 679 (finding that "the focus of... [the] inquiry must be on the creche in
the context of the Christmas season").
79. See id. at 687.
80. See id. at 671. The city owned the entire display. See id.
81. See id. at 679; see also infra note 87 (giving examples where the Court has even
refused to apply the Lemon test in some Establishment Clause cases).
82. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-83.
83. Id. at 680 ("When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it
is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion
of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle govern-
mental advocacy of a particular religious message.").
84. See id. at 683.
85. See id. at 679, 683; see also supra notes 23-24 (discussing context analysis); TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 1291-92 & nn.54-55 (stating that the Court's vagueness as to the meaning
of "context" resulted in problems in the lower courts). Tribe asserts that the Court re-
ferred to context either in the physical sense, i.e., what other secular objects were sur-
rounding the religious object, or in the sense of other official forms of recognition of
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opinion, but offered another method of analysis, the endorsement test,
for determining whether government action violated the Establishment
Clause.86
Over the years, the Supreme Court has retreated from the strict con-
fines of the Lemon test87 and has adopted Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test, which focuses first on whether the government intended to
send a message of approval or disapproval of religion. 8 This test next
considers, however, whether the act or policy did indeed send a message
of endorsement or disapproval to a reasonable observer, regardless of the
government's intention. 9 If either of these inquiries results in an affirm-
ative answer, the disputed government action must be declared invalid
and violative of the Establishment Clause.9" In determining whether a
message of endorsement is communicated, the endorsement test consid-
ers what an observer reasonably might perceive to be the reason for the
exhibit.9 The Court has stated that this perception necessarily relates to
the context or physical setting in which the symbol is displayed.92 The
Christmas. See id. The Court essentially suggests both, leaving lower courts with both
definitions to apply.
86. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. The Supreme Court has not always praised the Lemon test and, in fact, has even
refused to apply it on a number of occasions. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Lee, the Court ignored the Lemon test to find
that largely non-sectarian prayer at a high school graduation ceremony violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. See 505 U.S. at 587. Here, the Court relied mainly on the "coercive
pressure" of school sponsored prayer upon students. Id. at 592.
In Marsh, the Court upheld the federal government's policy of paying chaplains to begin
each day in the legislature with a prayer. See 463 U.S. at 794-95. This holding rested
largely on the history and tradition of chaplains beginning each daily legislative session.
See id. at 792. For criticism of the Lemon test, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also McConnell, supra note 20, at 128-30 (criticizing
the Lemon test and stating that the test has "an inherent tendency to devalue religious
exercise").
88. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595
(1989) (stating that Justice O'Connor's concurrence "provides a sound analytical frame-
work for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols"); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at
689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device."). Accord-
ing to Laurence Tribe, although Justice O'Connor's analysis in Lynch provided the correct
inquiry by focusing on the message conveyed to "nonadherents," her opinion appeared as
one of an "adherent." TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-15, at 1292-93.
89. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
90. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 597; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
91. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The "effects" portion of the test depends upon the
question of "what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display." Id.; see
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1292-93 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch).
92. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 597 ("[T]he government's use of religious sym-
bolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of
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Court adopted Justice O'Connor's framework in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.3
In Allegheny County, Justice Blackmun adopted the endorsement test
analysis because it focused on the message the government action con-
veyed.94 Justice Blackmun further stated that the effect-that is, a
viewer's perception of the display-necessarily depended on the "con-
text" or "particular physical setting" of the challenged object.9" In this
case, the Court found that, because it stood alone in the main area of the
county courthouse, the creche definitely communicated approval and
support of religion and violated the Establishment Clause.96 In contrast,
the Court found that the display of the menorah viewed in context-that
is, in the promotion of cultural diversity 97 -did not have the effect of
the government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its context."); supra notes 23-24
(discussing context).
93. 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989). The Allegheny County Court actually dealt with two
cases, involving two separate displays. See id. at 578. The first involved the display of a
creche by a local church in the main staircase of the county courthouse. See id. The sec-
ond case dealt with the display of an 18-foot, privately-owned menorah that was erected
and removed each year by the city. See id. The menorah was displayed at the City-County
Building, adjacent to the city's 45-foot Christmas tree and a sign reading "Salute to Lib-
erty." See id. at 581-82.
94. See id. at 595 (stating that Justice O'Connor's analysis "provide[d] a sound analyti-
cal framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols").
95. Id. In Lynch, Justice O'Connor stated that:
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche ... is not
neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical museum setting,
though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any
message of endorsement of that content. The display celebrates a public holiday,
and no one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an en-
dorsement of religion.
465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, the Court held that the display of a
creche in a public area did not violate the Establishment Clause because, viewed in the
context of the Christmas season, it was evident that the city had not acted with the requi-
site purpose of advancing religion. See id. at 681. The city sought only to "celebrate the
Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday," which the Court deemed to be "legiti-
mate secular purposes." Id. It is important to note, however, that earlier in the holding,
the Court seemed to regard the physical context in which the display occurred to be impor-
tant. See id. at 679; TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-15, at 1291 n.54 (discussing the interpretation
of the phrase "in context" with respect to Lynch).
96. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598-600. The creche, viewed in this "particular
physical setting," conveyed "an unmistakable message that [the County] support[ed] and
promote[d] the Christian praise to God that [was] the cr~che's religious message." Id. at
600 (quotations omitted).
97. See id. at 620 (finding that "for purposes of the Establishment Clause, the city's
overall display must be understood as conveying the city's secular recognition of different
traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season").
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promoting religion and, therefore, did not violate the Establishment
Clause.g8
II. PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND THE PUBLIC FORUM: No
MATCH MADE IN HEAVEN FOR THE LOWER COURTS
Lower courts have disagreed over whether private religious expression
in the form of unattended, symbolic displays on government property,
traditionally used for public speech, can constitute government endorse-
ment of religion.99 Many courts have even applied different forms of
analyses in reaching their conclusions. 100 Some courts have utilized the
98. See id. at 621.
99. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious symbol
was displayed on state property traditionally used for public expression); Kreisner v. City
of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no violation of Establishment Clause
where the city permitted private religious display to be erected in park used for public
forum not near seat of government), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994); Americans United
for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1549 (6th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious
display was erected on city property traditionally used as a public forum); Flamer v. City of
White Plains, 841 F. Supp. 1365, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the city would not
violate the Establishment Clause by permitting a private religious display to be displayed
in a traditional public forum not near the seat of government). But see Chabad-Lubavitch
of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause where a private religious display was erected in a city
park traditionally used as a public forum near the seat of government); Smith v. County of
Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 960 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding a violation of the Establishment
Clause where a private religious symbol was displayed on county property designated as a
public forum); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding a
violation of the Establishment Clause where a private religious display was erected on
public property adjacent to the seat of government); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
Colorado, 872 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause where a private religious display was erected in public park near the seat of
government), rev'd 898 P.2d 1013 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996).
100. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1391-93 (applying public forum analysis);
Kreisner, 1 F.3d at 781-85 (applying both the endorsement test and public forum analysis);
Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1544-47 (applying both the endorsement test and public
forum analysis); Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 111-12 (relying on Allegheny County
in determining that a religious symbol on government property violates the Establishment
Clause because it sends a message of endorsement of religion, and construing the presence
of a public forum as only a non-determinative factor to be considered); Smith, 895 F.2d at
958-59 (applying the endorsement test and regarding the presence of a public forum in the
case merely as a non-determinative factor); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029-30 (relying on Alle-
gheny County in determining that a religious symbol on government property violates the
Establishment Clause because it sends a message of endorsement of religion, and constru-
ing the presence of a public forum as only a non-determinative factor to be considered);
Flamer, 841 F. Supp. at 1373-78 (relying on the endorsement test in addition to public
forum analysis); Freedom from Religion Found., 872 P.2d at 1263 (using the endorsement
test only).
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endorsement test in their analyses of these cases, finding the presence of
a public forum to be only a non-determinative factor. 101 Still others have
incorporated the public forum approach into the endorsement test, re-
garding the presence of a public forum as preventing any possible percep-
tion of government endorsement of religion. 10 2
A. Private Religious Expression in a Public Forum Located at the
"Seat of Government" Does Not Violate the
Establishment Clause
Several of the federal circuits took the approach that a purely private
religious display erected in a public forum located at the "seat of govern-
ment" did not violate the Establishment Clause.0 3 In reaching this con-
clusion, these circuits adopted the endorsement test.'0 4 In each instance,
they regarded the existence of a public forum as largely determinative of
the fact that no reasonable person would perceive the display as a sign of
endorsement from the government. 10 5 In rejecting the compelling state
interest arguments where the private religious speech took place in a
traditional public forum located at the seat of government, these circuits
dismissed the contention that such speech produced a danger of per-
ceived government endorsement of religion.10 6
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit took this approach in Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller.0 7
Here, the court held that the private display of a menorah in a public
101. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 111-12 (relying on Allegheny County in
determining that a religious symbol on government property violates the Establishment
Clause because it sends a message of endorsement of religion, and construing the presence
of a public forum as only a non-determinative factor to be considered); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at
1029-30 (relying on Allegheny County in determining that a religious symbol on govern-
ment property violates the Establishment Clause because it sends a message of
endorsement of religion, and regarding the presence of a public forum as merely a non-
determinative factor); Freedom from Religion Found., 872 P.2d at 1263 (applying the en-
dorsement test and finding a violation of the Establishment Clause).
102. See Kreisner, 1 F.3d at 781-85 (applying the endorsement test as well as the public
forum approach); Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1544-47 (applying the endorsement test in
addition to public forum analysis); Flamer, 841 F. Supp. at 1373-78 (relying on the endorse-
ment test in addition to public forum analysis).
103. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1394; Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1554.
104. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1389-90; Americans United, 980 F.2d at
1553.
105. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1390; Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1553.
106. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1392; Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1549,
1553.
107. 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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forum did not violate the Establishment Clause.10 8 The court first recog-
nized that, in certain instances, Georgia may have a compelling interest in
complying with the Establishment Clause. 10 9 Applying the endorsement
test to determine whether there was an actual risk of a violation,"0 the
court found that no reasonable person would construe the display as gov-
ernment endorsement of religion."' The court, therefore, found no vio-
lation and rejected the state's claim of a compelling interest."12
Additionally, the court stated that even if Georgia did have a compelling
interest, its exclusion of the menorah was not narrowly constructed to
achieve that interest because the exclusion prevented Chabad's speech
entirely."13
The Sixth Circuit took this same approach to private religious displays
in a traditional public forum in Americans United for Separation of
108. See id. at 1387. The Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia, a non-profit religious organiza-
tion, sought to erect a menorah in the Rotunda of the center of the Capitol Building. See
id. at 1386. The Rotunda traditionally had been used for public "cultural, educational,
historical, and religious" activities. Id. Access to the Rotunda was granted based on "a
'content-neutral, equal access policy ... on a first-come, first-serve basis to all interested
parties."' Id. at 1387 (quoting Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 976 F.2d at 1390).
109. See id. at 1388.
110. See id. at 1389.
111. See id. at 1393 ("By permitting religious speech in a public forum ... the state
simply does not endorse, but rather acts in a strictly neutral manner toward, private
speech.").
112. See id. at 1395. The court stated that allowing the expression at the Rotunda
would not violate the first prong of the Lemon test because Georgia's purpose was secular
because it "provid[ed] an arena for its citizenry's exercise of the constitutional right to free
speech." Id. at 1389. In addition, the court stated that Georgia's policy did not violate the
third prong of the Lemon test because there was no excessive entanglement with religion
where the open access policy prevented any investigation into the content of the expres-
sion. See id. Lastly, the court determined that the Georgia policy did not violate the sec-
ond prong of the Lemon test because the policy did not have the "primary effect" of
endorsing religion. See id. at 1390-91. The court made this determination based on the
fact that, viewed in the context of a public forum, the expression could not be attributed to
the state. See id. at 1393.
113. See id. at 1395. The court observed that Georgia could have explained the charac-
ter of the public forum to observers in a disclaimer sign, rather than ban the content of the
speech. See id. Moreover, the court found that any misperception on the part of the gen-
eral public could be prevented simply by explaining the "nature of a public forum." Id.
The court asserted that this was the preferable option over banning all speech containing
questionable content. See id. This disclaimer approach was also advanced by Justice Sou-
ter in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2457 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring). Although the addition of a disclaimer lessens the likelihood that a
reasonable person would misperceive government endorsement of religion, the require-
ment of a disclaimer as a determinative factor in public forum analysis creates a host of
new problems. The courts then must determine, among other considerations, how big the
size of the sign need be in order to pass Establishment Clause standards, or from what
distance must it be able to be seen, or whether it need be in more than one language. See
Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450 n.4.
1996]
Catholic University Law Review
Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids."4 In this case, a private reli-
gious group sought to erect a menorah on a centrally-located public fo-
rum." 5 Applying the same analysis as the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit also rejected the compelling state interest argument. The court
found that a reasonable person, aware of the existence of a public forum
to which all persons were given access, would not perceive a message of
government endorsement of religion. 116 Hence, no violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause could occur.
B. Private Religious Expression in a Public Forum Located at the
"Seat of Government" Does Violate the Establishment Clause
Other circuits took a different outlook on the status of private religious
displays in a traditional public forum located at the seat of govern-
ment. 1 7 These circuits found that private religious displays convey
messages of government endorsement of religion and, therefore, violate
the Establishment Clause." 8 In addition, these circuits deemed the exist-
ence of a public forum to be merely one factor for consideration in deter-
mining whether a reasonable person would perceive that the display
conveyed a message of government endorsement of religion." 9
For example, in Chabad-Lubavitch of Vermont v. City of Burlington,12°
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the
endorsement test and the Supreme Court's decision in County of Alle-
114. 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
115. See id. at 1539-40. The plaza was deemed to be a public forum because, in the
history of its existence, it had always been open to all forms of speech. See id. at 1541.
Several local government buildings were also located on the plaza. See id. at 1540.
116. See id. at 1553 ("[T]ruly private religious expression in a truly public forum cannot
be seen as endorsement by a reasonable observer.").
117. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (finding an Establishment Clause violation where a private religious symbol
was displayed on government property used as a public forum); Smith v. County of Al-
bemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding an Establishment Clause violation
where a private group was permitted to display a religious symbol on government property
used as a public forum); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding the state's desire to avoid an Establishment Clause violation compelling as well as
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal, and upholding the content-based restriction placed
on private speech in the traditional public forum).
118. See infra notes 119-34 (finding violations of the Establishment Clause where pri-
vate religious displays were permitted in public fora).
119. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 111 (affirming Kaplan in refusing to find
the presence of a public forum to be a deciding factor in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence); Smith, 895 F.2d at 958 (asserting that the presence of a public forum is not disposi-
tive); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029 (finding the presence of a public forum merely to be a non-
controlling factor for consideration).
120. 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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gheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.12 1 In so doing, the Second
Circuit affirmed its prior decision in Kaplan v. City of Burlington122 by
deciding that the private display of a menorah on government property
used as a public forum communicated government endorsement of
religion.123 In Kaplan, the Second Circuit stated that the presence of a
public forum was not determinative, but merely one factor to be consid-
ered. 1 24 The court also recognized the fact that the forum was located
close to the seat of government.' 25 The Second Circuit concluded that
the state's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation was
compelling, and that its exclusion of the religious symbols was closely
constructed to achieve that interest.'26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also has
held that the private display of a religious symbol in a public forum close
to the seat of government violates the Establishment Clause. 27 In Smith
v. County of Albemarle,28 the Fourth Circuit held that the private display
of a creche on the lawn of the County Office Building 29 violated the
Establishment Clause.130 Applying the same analysis as the Second Cir-
121. IM. at 111; see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S., 573 (1989).
122. 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989).
123. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 112; Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1030. The court
in Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. referred to Kaplan in the following manner: "[W]e held in
Kaplan that the display of an unattended, solitary, semipermanent, religious symbol in the
Park, given the Park's 'close association with the seat of government,' violates the Estab-
lishment Clause." 936 F.2d at 111 (citation omitted).
124. See Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029; see also Farber & Nowak, supra note 27, at 1234.
Farber and Nowak assert that the First Amendment was designed to "'protect[ ] people,
not places."' Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). They argue that
the allowance or prohibition of speech should be related to the value of that speech and
the governmental interest implicated. See id. at 1222-24. Farber and Nowak further assert
that public forum analysis offers little or no guidance to the lower courts because it pre-
vents them from assessing the values attached to certain speech. See id.
125. See Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1030.
126. See id. The court noted:
Observance of the constitutional mandate of the Establishment Clause may prop-
erly be characterized as a compelling governmental interest and a prohibition lim-
ited to displays of unattended, solitary religious symbols on public property would
be narrowly tailored to serve that end, since it would allow the continued use of
City Hall Park for all other uses.
I& (citations omitted).
127. See Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir. 1990).
128. 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
129. See i& at 955. Although the lawn of the County Office Building had been used for
such events as weddings and concerts, the court held that it was not a public forum. See id.
at 958 n.5. But see id. at 960 n.1 (Blatt, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court had
classified the lawn as "either a traditional ... or a designated public forum").
130. See id. at 958.
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cuit, the court recognized the state's compelling interest in complying
with the Establishment Clause,'131 and noted that the presence of a public
forum was merely a non-determinative factor to be given considera-
tion. 32 The Fourth Circuit further found that the private religious dis-
play located in this forum near the seat of government, viewed in context,
had the effect of communicating government endorsement of religion
and, thus, violated the Establishment Clause.133 The court reasoned that
because the religious display was not affiliated with any non-religious
symbols and was located on public property directly in front of a govern-
ment building, no reasonable observer could help but think that the gov-
ernment endorsed the display.13 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied a
similar rationale in Doe v. Small.135 There, the court reversed an injunc-
tion against the City of Ottawa, Illinois, which prevented the city from
permitting the display of private religious paintings in a local park tradi-
tionally used as a public forum.'36 The court held that the exclusion re-
stricted private citizens from exercising their rights to free speech and
free expression based solely on the religious content of their speech. 137
The state's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause was not
sufficiently compelling to justify a content-based restriction where the fo-
rum at issue traditionally was public.'3 8 The court took special care, how-
ever, to distinguish Doe v. Small from a situation involving a public forum
located at the seat of government. 139 The court hypothesized that if such
131. See id. at 959.
132. See id. at 958; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing cases
finding the presence of a public forum to be merely a non-determinative factor).
133. See Smith, 895 F.2d at 959-60. In Smith, there was a dispute regarding whether the
forum involved was a traditional public forum. See id. at 958. The court of appeals upheld
the district court's finding that the forum was not a public one. See id. at 958-60. The
dissenting judge found, however, that the district court had determined the forum "to be
either a traditional public forum or a designated public forum." Id. at 960 n.1.
134. See id. at 958. The appellate court took time to distinguish Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) by applying the Lemon test. See id. at 959. The court recognized that, in
Widmar, the Supreme Court found that the Lemon test factors were not implicated where
religious groups were given access to open university facilities. See id. In distinguishing
Widmar, however, the court asserted that the effects prong of the Lemon test was impli-
cated and violated by erecting a private religious display near the seat of government. See
id. The court of appeals found the "associational message" to be too strong to pass Estab-
lishment Clause requirements. See id.
135. 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
136. See id. at 618-19.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 622.
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a case were to arise, the Establishment Clause could compel the removal
of a religious display in the absence of a narrowly-tailored restriction.14°
III. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOARD v. PINETTE:
THE PUBLIC FORUM EXCEPTION TO THE
ENDORSEMENT TEST
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette14 1 to resolve the conflict among the circuits
regarding the Establishment Clause issue implicated when private reli-
gious expression takes place in a traditional public forum located at the
seat of government. 142
In Capitol Square, the Ku Klux Klan was denied permission to erect an
unattended Latin cross on the grounds of the Ohio State Capitol, 43 a
traditional public forum.'" The Board denied the Klan's request in an
attempt to comply with the Establishment Clauses of the United States
and Ohio Constitutions. 45 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio rejected the Board's argument on the grounds
that the speech was purely private and protected by the First Amend-
ment, that the square was a traditional public forum lacking any restric-
tions on unattended displays, and that the Board failed to demonstrate
that the display might be perceived as state endorsement of religion.'46
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the
same grounds. 47
140. See id. This caveat puts the Seventh Circuit in line with the rationales of the Sec-
ond and Fourth Circuits. That is, private religious displays in a public forum located at the
"seat of government" violate the Establishment Clause. See supra notes 117-134 and ac-
companying text (discussing Second and Fourth Circuit cases involving private religious
displays located at the seat of government).
141. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
142. See id. at 2444.
143. See id. at 2445.
144. See id. at 2444. The square had been used for over one-hundred years as a place
for "public speeches, gatherings, and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety of
causes, both secular and religious." Id.
145. See id. at 2445.
146. See id.
147. See id. That decision was in accord with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Chabad-
Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, but contradicted the Second Circuit's ruling in Kaplan v. City of
Burlington, and the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Smith v. County of Albemarle. See id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. See Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995).
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A. The Majority Opinion: Private Symbolic Religious Expression in a
Traditional Public Forum Located at the Seat of Government
is No Sin
In Capitol Square, the Supreme Court considered whether an Estab-
lishment Clause violation occurred where a state, by way of a content-
neutral policy, allowed for the display of a privately-owned, unattended,
religious symbol in a traditional public forum situated adjacent to its seat
of government. 148 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
judgment in finding no Establishment Clause violation.149 The Court re-
iterated its position that while private religious expression is protected as
secular, private speech by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment,15° the right to conduct such speech on government property is not
unlimited.' 5 ' The right varies with respect to the classification of the land
as a public, limited public, or non-public forum.'52 In this case, Capitol
Square was classified as a public forum for two reasons. First, it had been
open to the public for many years as a place for speeches, gatherings, and
festivals.' 53 Second, Ohio state law explicitly opened the square for pub-
lic use. 154 This public forum status required that any content-based re-
strictions on private speech be closely tailored to further a compelling
state interest. 155
The Court then acknowledged that a state's interest in complying with
the Establishment Clause was sufficiently compelling to warrant content-
148. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444. The Court first stated that it would not
consider the issue of whether the State of Ohio violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment based on the possibility that the State had excluded the Klan's display be-
cause of its disapproval of the Klan's political views. See id. at 2445.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in parts I, II, and III and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. See id. at 2444.
149. See id. at 2450.
150. See id. at 2446.
151. See id.
152. See id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 799-804 (1985) (noting the nuances between the different types of fora); id. at
815-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing further the relationship between forum status
and the right to Free Speech); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 44-46 (1983) (noting that the breadth of the First Amendment right to Free Speech
depends upon the type of forum in which the speech occurs).
153. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444.
154. See id
155. See id. at 2446; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (requiring a
"compelling state interest.., that.., is narrowly drawn"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461, 464-65 (1980) (mandating a "finely tailored [regulation that] serve[s] substantial state
interests"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (noting that the regulating party car-




based restrictions on speech. 56 The Court, however, rejected Ohio's ar-
gument that such a violation was possible in this case. 1 57 The Court noted
the factors it had considered determinative in both Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar in holding that the Establishment Clause was not violated where
religious speech was entirely private, and where it took place in either a
traditional or designated public forum, accessible to all on the same
basis.158
B. The Plurality Opinion: The Endorsement Test's Fall from Grace
A plurality of the Court considered Ohio's argument that, because the
public forum was located so close to the seat of government, the display
could be construed as having governmental approval. 59 In rejecting this
argument, the plurality found that religious speech receiving an incidental
benefit through a content-neutral state policy could not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. 6 ° Significantly, the display of the cross was permitted
through a neutral policy of equal access to the forum.' 6' The plurality
further stated that it normally tested for endorsement of religion where
the government itself was engaged in religious expression, or where the
government demonstrated favoritism toward religious expression. 62
156. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446. The Court stated, "There is no doubt that
compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify content-based restrictions on speech." Id.; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993) (citing Widmar and noting that compli-
ance with the' Establishment Clause may be a compelling state interest); Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 271 (stating that compliance with the Establishment Clause "may be characterized as
compelling").
157. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447. This holding is in accord with prior holdings
in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District and Widmar v. Vincent.
In both of those cases, the Court refused to accept the states' interests as sufficiently com-
pelling to warrant content-based restrictions on speech. See supra notes 62-71 and accom-
panying text (discussing the holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar).
158. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447.
159. See id. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality and was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas in part IV. See id. at 2444.
160. See id. at 2447-49. The Court noted that it had traditionally found no violation of
the Establishment Clause where the government maintained neutral policies that afforded
an incidental benefit to religion. See id.; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961).
161. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444 (noting that any group may have access to
the Square by simply filling out the application and meeting the "safety, sanitation, and
non-interference with other uses" requirements).
162. See id. at 2447. The Court stated that it traditionally "tested for [the] endorsement
of religion, [where] the subject of the test was either expression by the government itself, or
else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or
activity." Id. (citation omitted).
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Since neither of these factors was present in the case, the plurality de-
clined to apply any test to the private speech. 163
Ohio invited the Court to apply the endorsement test, and to uphold its
content-based restriction on the basis that an onlooker might perceive the
private religious speech to be government endorsement of religion."6
The plurality declined the invitation, however, and refused to apply the
endorsement test, finding that Ohio actually was suggesting a "trans-
ferred endorsement test," which was inappropriate in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 165 The plurality described the transferred endorse-
ment test as one requiring the Court to attribute private religious speech
to a neutrally-acting government.1 66 This test would dictate that the
Court impose Establishment Clause requirements, normally confined to
government action, upon private citizens. Such a test was a legal leap
that the plurality was unwilling to make.
The plurality then contrasted many of its previous Establishment
Clause holdings.' 67 It recalled that the display of a creche in a forum not
open to the public generally violated the Establishment Clause because it
resulted in the perception of governmental favoritism; 16 however, the
display of a creche in the context of the holiday season did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it did not result in a perception of endorse-
ment of religion.169 The plurality further noted in Capitol Square that
there was no precedent that neutral governmental policies permitting pri-
163. See id. at 2447-48.
164. See id. at 2447. Ohio argued that "an observer might mistake private expression
for officially endorsed religious expression." Id.
165. Id. at 2447-48 ("The test petitioners propose, which would attribute to a neutrally
behaving government private religious expression, has no antecedent in our jurisprudence,
and would better be called a 'transferred endorsement' test.").
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2448.
168. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599-
600 (1989); see also Laycock, supra note 57, at 15. Laycock states that it is simply illogical
to infer that the state endorses religious speech that occurs in a public forum. See id. This
discussion takes place in the context of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074
(1994). See id. at 14-15. The Act statutorily ensures that student-initiated religious groups
receive the same access to school facilities used as public fora as all non-religious student
groups. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994). Laycock points out that this equal access does not
result in endorsement of religion because, "[t]he proposition that government does not
endorse everything it fails to censor is fundamental to our open system of government."
Laycock, supra, note 57, at 15. Furthermore, he states that high school students are fully
capable of understanding this concept so as not to misconstrue private religious speech as
government endorsement. See id.
169. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
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vate religious speech in public fora violated the Establishment Clause.17°
The plurality also recalled that no violation of the Establishment Clause
occurred where private religious groups were given access to school facili-
ties open to the public because the "primary effect" of such access did not
cause a perception of endorsement of religion.'71
In surveying these holdings, the plurality held that there was an essen-
tial distinction between government speech endorsing religion and pri-
vate speech endorsing religion' 72 in that the former was prohibited by the
Establishment Clause, while the latter was protected by the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses.173 In refusing to extend the endorsement test
to private speech in a public forum, 7 4 the plurality also rejected the con-
tention that the difference between private religious expression and gov-
ernment religious expression disappeared when the private speech could
be misconstrued as government expression.
175
The plurality further discussed the potential policy implications of ap-
plying a transferred endorsement test. The plurality asserted that appli-
cation of the endorsement test to private speech would require school
districts and universities to revamp their access policies to prevent "some
undetermined mass of the community" from possibly misperceiving pri-
vate expression as government endorsed.' 76 According to the plurality, a
transferred endorsement test would force policy makers to consider an
onslaught of onerous factors before adopting seemingly neutral poli-
170. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448 (finding that Lynch v. Donnelly "neither holds
nor even remotely assumes that the government's neutral treatment of private religious
expression can be unconstitutional").
171. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395
(1993) (stating that "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to
religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental"); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981) (stating that "in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
advancement of religion would not be the forum's 'primary effect'); see also Laycock,
supra note 57, at 14-15 (discussing the Equal Access Act which gives student religious
groups the same access to school facilities as enjoyed by other groups).
172. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 2447-48.
175. See id. at 2448.
176. Id. at 2449. The Court contended:
Petitioners' rule would require school districts adopting similar policies [as in
Lamb's Chapel] in the future to guess whether some undetermined critical mass
of the community might nonetheless perceive the district to be advocating a reli-
gious viewpoint. Similarly, state universities would be forced to reassess our
statement that "an open forum in a public university does not confer any impri-
matur of state approval on religious sects or practices."
Id. (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).
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cies.177 Policy makers would be rendered impotent by the notion that any
neutral policy incidentally granting a "benefit" of equal access to those
professing their religious beliefs could be invalidated by the mispercep-
tions of the ever-mysterious "reasonable observer. '17 8 The plurality con-
cluded that the application of the transferred endorsement test to private
religious speech would greatly affect public policy if the "hypothetical ob-
server" could confuse laws providing an incidental benefit to religion with
government endorsement of religion.'79
C. The Concurrences: At Peace With the Endorsement Test
Justice Thomas concurred separately, agreeing with the resolution of
the case based solely on the manner in which it was appealed to the
Court.18 0 The case was appealed on Establishment Clause grounds' 81 as
opposed to political free speech grounds and, according to Justice
Thomas, was correctly decided on that issue.182 He pointed out, however,
that the display of a cross by the Ku Klux Klan was hardly an act of
religious expression given the Klan's history of intimidation through
cross-burning. 83 He considered this act to be one of political expression
and, thus, questioned whether the Establishment Clause issue was even
implicated in the case.' 84
177. See id. The Court further asserted:
Every proposed act of private, religious expression in a public forum would force
officials to weigh a host of imponderables. How close to government is too close?
What kind of building, and in what context, symbolizes state authority? If the
State guessed wrong in one direction it would be guilty of an Establishment
Clause violation; if in the other, it would be liable for suppressing free exercise or
free speech (a risk not run when the State restrains only its own expression).
Id.
178. See id. at 2449-50.
179. See id. The plurality noted the potentially drastic effect on public policy if "neutral
laws are invalid whenever hypothetical observers may-even reasonably-confuse an inci-
dental benefit to religion with state endorsement." Id.
180. See id. at 2450-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. Justice Thomas implied that the true issue in Capitol Square may have been free-
dom of political speech rather than a possible Establishment Clause violation. See id. at
2450. He stated, "the erection of such a cross [by the Ku Klux Klan] is a political act, not a
Christian one." Id.
182. See id. at 2451.
183. See id. at 2450-51. Justice Thomas discussed the specific role of the cross in Klan
ceremonies. See id. He acknowledged that, while some Klan members may associate a
religious meaning to the cross, its message was fundamentally political in this context. See
id. at 2451; see also Joan Biskupic, Potent Questions from Quiet Justice, WASH. POST, May
29, 1995, at A13 (reporting on the normally reserved Justice Thomas and his questions
regarding the cross as an alleged religious symbol for the Klan).
184. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451.
[Vol. 46:285
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion, but wrote separately to dis-
agree with the plurality's refusal to apply the endorsement test.185 She
reiterated her approval of the endorsement test as providing the correct
framework for analyzing government policies that relate to the exhibition
of religious symbols, 86 and further noted her adherence to the reason-
able observer standard in the application of the endorsement test. 87 Jus-
tice O'Connor criticized the plurality for its constrained application of the
endorsement test to cases involving only government religious expres-
sion, or government favoritism toward religion."a She asserted that
nothing in the Court's history of Establishment Clause cases suggested
that the endorsement test did not apply to private religious speech in a
public forum.18 9 In addition, Justice O'Connor noted that a number of
the lower courts had applied the endorsement test to private speech in a
public forum.'9 °
Justice O'Connor also criticized the plurality for suggesting that public
policy would be greatly affected by a hypothetical observer's reasonable,
but confused perception of an incidental benefit to religion as state ap-
185. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. See id.
186. See id.; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573,628 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It was
in Allegheny County that Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, adopted Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test, first espoused in Lynch v. Donnelly. See 492 U.S. at 595.
187. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2452 (asserting that "the endorsement test neces-
sarily focuses upon the perception of a reasonable, informed observer"); see also Brief for
Petitioners at 34, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995) (No. 94-780) ("The endorsement test focuses on the perspective of a 'reasonable
observer' to determine whether a government action would be perceived as endorsing
religion.").
188. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451-52.
189. See id. at 2453 ("[Olur prior cases do not imply that the endorsement test has no
place where private religious speech in a public forum is at issue.").
190. See id.; Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc) (applying the endorsement test and finding no violation where a religious group was
permitted to erect a religious display on government property with a history of use as a
public forum); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 1993) (using the
endorsement test and finding no violation where a private display was allowed in a tradi-
tional public forum), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994); Americans United for Separation
of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1554 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(utilizing the endorsement test and finding no violation where a private religious display
was permitted in a traditional public forum); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (using the endorsement test and overturning an injunction which pre-
vented the city from permitting a private religious display in a traditional public forum);
Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1990) (using the endorsement
test and finding a violation where a private religious display was allowed in a somewhat
public forum); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying
the endorsement test and finding a violation where a private religious group sought to
erect a religious display in a traditional public forum).
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proval. 19' She declared that in such a case, the Court had a "duty" to
invalidate those government practices because the Establishment Clause
requires that a state, in certain instances, actively prevent misperception
of government approval of private religious speech."9 Consequently, she
strongly disagreed with the plurality's public forum exception to the en-
dorsement test.1 93
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Souter also criticized the plu-
rality for creating a per se public forum rule, thus diverging from prece-
dent. 9 4  He further asserted that the plurality's public forum rule
provided a "serious loophole" in the security afforded by the endorse-
ment test. 195 He stated that this "loophole" would lure a government to
manipulate neutral policies to encourage private parties to exhibit reli-
191. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2454.
192. See id. ("[The Establishment Clause] also imposes affirmative obligations that may
require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or
endorsing a private religious message."). But see The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading
Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 170, 177 (1995) (discussing Capitol Square and stating that
"[e]liminating the possibility of occasional misperception is not worth the commensurate
loss of free exercise rights to religious speakers.") [hereinafter Leading Cases].
193. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451.
194. See id. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Breyer concurring in part and concurring in judgment. See id. Justice Sou-
ter concurred in large part because of the possibility of affixing a disclaimer to the display.
See id. He asserted that a government disclaimer would alleviate any possibility of mis-
perception of endorsement. See id. For commentary on the use of disclaimers in the pub-
lic forum, see Recent Case, Establishment Clause-Religious Displays on Public
Property-Colorado Supreme Court Upholds Display of Ten Commandments on Public
Property, 109 HARV. L. REV. 530, 533-34 (1995) (examining State v. Freedom from Reli-
gion Found., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995)). Although it acknowledges potential problems,
this article suggests that courts could require states to display disclaimers on all religious
symbols erected in public fora, thus averting any misperception of endorsement. See id.
This article argues that the absence of a disclaimer would put the burden on the state to
rebut a presumption of state endorsement; if a disclaimer were present, the burden would
shift to the plaintiff. See id. at 534. Unfortunately, this article fails to recognize that re-
quiring disclaimers only for religious displays would manifest government hostility toward
religion, which the Establishment Clause also prohibits. Disclaimers must be required for
all displays if states are to avert an Establishment Clause violation.
195. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2461. Justice Souter asserts that the plurality's
framework will result in an Establishment Clause violation only where government "inten-
tionally endorses religion or willfully 'foster[s]' a misperception of endorsement in the fo-
rum." Id. He concludes from the plurality's framework that a serious loophole is created
because it allows governmental bodies and officials "to encourage a multiplicity of reli-
gious speakers to erect displays in public forums." Id. Justice Souter deduces that the
plurality opinion allows government to invite and encourage private religious displays as
long as the government does not operate the forum so as to exclude all other speech. See
id.
What Justice Souter seems to dismiss is the plurality's acknowledgment of such a scena-
rio. See id. at 2448-49 (plurality opinion). In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia explicitly
notes that preferential access of religious speech to public fora by the government would
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gious displays, allowing the government to achieve indirectly what it
could not achieve directly. 9 6 Unfortunately, Justice Souter did not clar-
ify how or why the government would attempt to engage in such an
endeavor.
197
D. The Dissenters: Yet Another Definition of the Omniscient
Reasonable Observer
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Establishment Clause cre-
ated a "strong presumption against" unattended religious displays on
government property, and that this presumption cannot be rebutted by
the fact that the property traditionally has been used as a public forum. 9
The message sent by such displays violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause the reasonable observer necessarily would attribute that message to
the sovereign state.1 99 Justice Stevens adopted this reasonable observer
standard, also advocated by Justice O'Connor, to determine whether the
be government "favoritism" of religion. See id. at 2449. Such government policy would
violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 2448-49.
196. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2461 (Souter, J., concurring); Leading Cases,
supra note 192, at 177. The Leading Cases article discusses Justice Souter's (as well as
Justice O'Connor's) fears that the public forum exception would result in a misperception
of endorsement and government encouragement of religion. See id. It rebuts those fears
by reiterating what Justice Scalia pointed out in the plurality opinion. See id. The public
forum exception applies only to private speech. See id. If the government expresses or
favors religious speech, the exception does not apply. See id. The article offers examples
of government favoritism that would not be subject to public forum analysis such as al-
lowing religious speakers long-term permits, favoring their applications, simplifying their
application process, or specifically encouraging them to apply. See id.
197. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2461. Justice Souter did mention that following
the issuance of the injunction in this case, a local church council "proposed to invite all
local churches to erect crosses, and the Board granted 'blanket permission' for 'all
churches friendly to or affiliated with' the council to do so." Id. (citation omitted). The
result was a square covered with crosses. See id. Justice Souter further acknowledged that
"while the effect in this case may have provided more embarrassment than suspicion of
endorsement, the opportunity for the latter is clear." Id.
The 'blanket permission' granted in this case does seem to violate the Establishment
Clause because the Board publicly and expressly invited 'friendly' churches to erect reli-
gious symbols. This government invitation results in an advancement of religious beliefs
over non-religious ones, and clearly violates the principles of the Establishment Clause. If,
however, the church (or any other private individual or group for that matter) had simply
invited other groups to apply for a permit to erect a cross, this would not have been a
violation of the Establishment Clause because of the protection the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses afford. Furthermore, if these private groups did apply for permission to
erect religious symbols, Capitol Square holds that such permission does not violate the
Establishment Clause.
198. See id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 2467 ("The 'reasonable observer' of any symbol placed unattended in
front of any capitol in the world will normally assume that the sovereign-which is not only
the owner of that parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for the surrounding territory-
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state was sending a message of endorsement.2 ° ° In contrast to Justice
O'Connor, however, Justice Stevens concluded that the reasonable ob-
server would attribute the message sent by a private religious symbol dis-
played in a public forum near the seat of government to the
government. 20 1 He stated that it is only natural for a reasonable observer
to assume that where a landowner allows a religious symbol to be dis-
played on his property, that landowner must endorse the message sent by
the symbol. 202
Justice Stevens further stated that the message of government endorse-
ment sent by such displays was not eliminated by the presence of the
public forum factor because such an argument would attribute to an "ul-
tra-reasonable observer" exceptional comprehension of the many nu-
ances of First Amendment jurisprudence.203  According to Justice
Stevens, it was unrealistic to assume that a reasonable person would be
aware of the distinctions between "public," "limited public," and "non-
public forums.'"204 The reasonable person, however, could distinguish a
state capitol from a church.20 5
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that if the true goal of the
Establishment Clause was to separate church and state, then a state may
not allow a private, unattended, religious symbol to be displayed next to
the seat of government because such a display would defeat this goal.'
has sponsored and facilitated its message."). Several scholars steadfastly dispute Justice
Stevens' assertion. See Laycock, supra note 57, at 15; Robertson, supra note 6, at 12.
200. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2466.
201. See id. at 2466-67.
202. See id. at 2467 ("[Wlhen a statue or some other freestanding, silent, unattended,
immoveable structure-regardless of its particular message-appears on the lawn of the
Capitol building, the reasonable observer must identify the State either as the messenger,
or, at the very least, as one who has endorsed the message."). In applying the endorsement
test, Justice Stevens concluded that the display of the cross in Capitol Square had the
"'principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."' Id. at 2471 (citation
omitted).
203. See id. at 2469. According to Justice Stevens, such a notion conferred the idea of
an "ultra-reasonable observer" who could comprehend "the vagaries of [the] Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
204. See id. Justice Stevens stated that he thought "it presumptuous to consider such
knowledge a precondition of Establishment Clause protection." Id. For further criticism
of public forum analysis, see Mawdsley, supra note 60, at 534-37.
205. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2469. It was enough for Justice Stevens that
"some reasonable observer[ ]" would ascribe religious speech to the state. Id. at 2470. He
stated that merely because a person is not familiar with all the Establishment Clause nu-
ances, does not mean that he is less deserving of constitutional protection from govern-
ment endorsement of religion. See id. at 2469-70.
206. See id at 2474-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote separately,
stating that she did not join with Justice Stevens in his reliance on the possibility of affixing
a disclaimer to the religious display in order to prevent a violation of the Establishment
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Justice Ginsburg assumed, without explanation, that a display lacking a
live speaker or a visible disclaimer to disassociate the religious message
from the state will be attributed automatically to the state, thereby violat-
ing the Establishment Clause.2 °7
IV. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS: ACHIEVING HARMONY BETWEEN THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE SPEECH AND
FREE EXPRESSION
The Supreme Court in Capitol Square adopted the proper form of anal-
ysis for reviewing the display of a private, unattended, religious symbol in
a traditional public forum located in proximity to the seat of govern-
ment.2 °8 In adopting public forum analysis over the endorsement test,
the plurality strikes a necessary balance between the Establishment
Clause and First Amendment Free Speech and Free Expression rights.20 9
Furthermore, the plurality's approach is consistent with prior Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. 210 Finally, Capitol Square provides valuable
insight into the inapplicability of the endorsement test to private speech
in the public forum arena.21'
Clause. See id at 2475. She declared that the issue of constitutionality as to affixing a
disclaimer to the display was an issue "for another day and case." Id.
207. See id. at 2474.
208. See infra notes 212-44 and accompanying text (asserting that the plurality's conclu-
sion follows traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and clarifying the proper ap-
plication of the endorsement test); see also Brief for Respondents at 39-41, Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (No. 94-780) (stating that the
Court has acknowledged public forum analysis for over a century); Leading Cases, supra
note 192, at 175-76, 177 (stating that the plurality's public forum exception to the endorse-
ment test provides clarity and coherence in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
209. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449 (stating that the application of petitioners'
"transferred endorsement" test would place policy makers "in a vise between the Estab-
lishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses on the other").
210. See id. at 2447 (noting that incidental benefits to religion through neutral govern-
ment policies do not violate the Establishment Clause); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
608 (1988) (stating that "'religious institutions need not be quarantined from public bene-
fits that are neutrally available to all"') (citation omitted); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 273 (1981) (explaining that the "enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits" is not vio-
lative of the Establishment Clause) (citation omitted); see also Leading Cases, supra note
192, at 176 (finding that the Court's holding in Capitol Square is consistent with the well-
established notion that incidental benefits to religion, via neutral policies, do not violate
the Establishment Clause).
211. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447-50.
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A. Public Forum Analysis: Consistent with the Notion that Incidental
Benefits to Religion Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause
The plurality's acceptance of public forum analysis in Capitol Square is
consistent with the well-established principle that neutral government
policies incidentally benefitting religion do not violate the Establishment
Clause.212 In its analysis, the plurality criticizes the illogical contention
that the government impermissibly could favor a religious display simply
by offering the same equal access to a public forum that all other displays
receive.213 If incidental benefits to religion do not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, a neutral policy adopted for, and applicable to, all persons
in the same manner cannot be unconstitutional simply because certain
persons practicing a religion happen to receive the same benefits that
everyone else enjoys.214 The denial of these benefits to religious persons,
based solely on the fact that they practice a religion, would be prohibitive
and hostile to religion and, therefore, violate the Establishment
Clause.2"5 The public forum exception to the endorsement test is consis-
tent with the notion that neutral policies incidentally benefitting religion
do not violate the Establishment Clause since the Establishment Clause
212. See supra note 8 (discussing cases where the Supreme Court has upheld neutral
state policies affording incidental benefits to religion).
213. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447. This suggestion is made in the concurring
opinions of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter. See id. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); id. at 2461 (Souter, J., concurring).
We find it peculiar to say that government 'promotes' or 'favors' a religious dis-
play by giving it the same access to a public forum that all other displays enjoy.
And as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held
that it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that happen to
benefit religion.
Id. at 2447 (plurality opinion); see also Laycock, supra note 57, at 9-14 (noting the govern-
ment does not endorse what it does not censor); Robertson, supra note 6, at 258-59, 275.
214. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (holding that the "legisla-
tion, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools"); see also Laycock, supra note 57, at 11 (defining neutrality as something that
"neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or practice"); Robertson, supra note 6,
at 237 (discussing the concept of neutrality and its application to the endorsement test).
215. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (stating that a state's
refusal to permit religious groups to use facilities available to others would not demon-
strate neutrality toward religion, but rather hostility, which the Establishment Clause also
proscribes). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added); see also McConnell, supra note 20, at 117 ("The Free Exercise Clause
forbids Congress (and, after incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, any gov-
ernment) to discriminate against religion .... ).
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permits religious groups to receive the same access that secular groups
receive.2
16
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, goes so far as to intimate
that the public forum exception would allow government to adopt seem-
ingly neutral policies in an attempt to encourage religious expression,
while divorcing itself from the ramifications of such policies. 217 Although
such scenarios could arise, Justice O'Connor overlooks that such in-
stances more than likely would constitute outright government favoritism
of religion, and be prohibited by the Establishment Clause.218
In addition to the consistency with the incidental benefits cases, public
forum analysis is consistent with the Court's prior holdings in Widmar2 19
and Lamb's Chapel.22° In both of these cases, the Supreme Court held
that private religious speech on public property open for free expression
would not violate the Establishment Clause.22' Although these cases in-
volved private, oral, religious expression rather than private, symbolic,
religious speech, the Court still found the existence of a forum previously
opened to the public to be a determinative factor in assessing whether an
Establishment Clause violation had occurred.222
B. Clarification in the Usage of the Endorsement Test
In Capitol Square, the plurality restricted the endorsement test's appli-
cation to government religious expression and government acts favoring
religion.223 The rejection of the endorsement test in the context of pri-
216. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608 (1988) (noting cases that upheld state
allocations of benefits to both public and private school children); see also Laycock, supra
note 57, at 9-14 (discussing the relevance of public forum analysis to denial of facility
access).
217. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2454 (stating that the states are not to use the
Establishment Clause as a shield to relieve them of the responsibility of employing neutral
criteria and monitoring their effects).
218. See id. at 2449; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (establishing that the
Court construes endorsement to mean "favoritism" or "promotion" as well).
219. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Court found
no violation where private religious expression was given equal access to a "generally pub-
lic forum").
220. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (noting the significance of a public
forum to the Court's analysis).
221. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
222. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (noting the factors the Court re-
garded as determinative in its analysis).
223. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447-49; see also McConnell, supra note 20, at
156-57. McConnell asserts that the endorsement test should be used only where govern-
ment shows favoritism or preference toward religion, not where the possibility of endorse-
ment exists. See id. Analyzing the "equal access" dilemma in public schools, McConnell
notes that under the endorsement test, equal access to religious groups would violate the
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vate religious expression in a public forum should instruct the lower
courts as to the situations in which the test properly should be applied. 224
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor observed that many of the lower
courts have used the endorsement test to evaluate whether private, unat-
tended, religious symbols displayed in a public forum on government
property near the seat of government violated the Establishment
Clause.225 In its excision of the endorsement test from the public forum
context, however, the plurality notes that the lower courts have reached
conflicting conclusions despite the fact that they applied the endorsement
test.226 The plurality asserts that this "chaos" is just one reason for creat-
ing the public forum exception to the endorsement test.227 This exception
provides a more clear-cut analytical framework.228
The plurality further criticizes the endorsement test by noting the lack
of agreement regarding the true identity of the reasonable observer.229
As the plurality aptly observes, if Justice O'Connor, in her concur-
rence,23° and Justice Stevens, in his dissent,23' cannot arrive at a single
conclusion, it is highly improbable that the nation's lower courts can be
expected to apply the test with consistent outcomes.232
Justice O'Connor attributes to the reasonable observer knowledge of
the history of a particular piece of government property as a public fo-
Establishment Clause because it sends a message that schools believe that religion has
something to contribute to the educational process. See id. He further asserts that if the
courts tested for favoritism or preference, equal access would survive constitutional scru-
tiny. See id. at 157.
224. See supra notes 99-140 and accompanying text (noting the different forms of analy-
ses the lower courts use, as well as the different conclusions reached when courts apply the
endorsement test).
225. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2453 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. See id. at 2450 n.3 (plurality opinion).
227. See id. at 2450.
228. See id at 2450 n.3 (stating that "[the endorsement test] supplies no standard
whatsoever").
229. See id.
230. See id. at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the reasonable "observer is
.. 'a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the
[collective] social judgment"') (citing W. KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
231. See id. at 2466 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the reasonable observer is
any "viewer[ ] of the religious display.., likely to perceive a government endorsement").
In addition, Justice Stevens believed that Justice O'Connor's ideal reasonable observer was
"presumptuous" because it assumed that such person had knowledge of the various nu-
ances in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 2469. He called this person the
"ultra-reasonable observer." See id.
232. See id. at 2450 n.3 (plurality opinion).
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rum."' She comes to the conclusion that the reasonable observer, with
full knowledge of this history, would not perceive the private religious
expression as government endorsement. 2" Justice O'Connor seems to
imply, therefore, that the reasonable observer is virtually confusion-
free.235 Yet, earlier in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor disagrees with
the plurality's assertion that major public policy problems would be impli-
cated if the government were forced to invalidate neutral laws "whenever
hypothetical observers may-even reasonably--confuse an incidental
benefit to religion" with government approval.236 Instead, she finds that
where a reasonable observer perceives such endorsement, the Court has a
duty to invalidate the laws.237 It seems inconsistent to argue that the rea-
sonable observer is confusion-free, as Justice O'Connor so infers, and yet,
at the same time, impose a duty upon the Court to invalidate any equal
access laws that the reasonable observer misconstrues as government en-
dorsement of religion.
Furthermore, it is unclear why this fully informed reasonable observer,
with knowledge of the public property's use as a forum for free expres-
sion, would become confused when exposed to private symbolic speech,
such as a cross, as opposed to symbolic speech of another kind or even to
oral speech, such as a Christian group's pro-life rally.238 Equally puzzling
is why the mistaken perception of a fully informed reasonable observer
should result in the infringement of an individual's rights to free speech
and free expression.239
233. See id. at 2455-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also assumes that
this hypothetical "reasonable observer" must possess the "perspective ... not only ... of
the reasonable member of the majority, but must at least be that of a composite of all
members of society or of the 'reasonable non-adherent."' Brief for Petitioners at 34, Capi-
tol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (No. 94-780). This
assessment of the reasonable observer is different from the one Justice Stevens proffers.
See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2454-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2466 n.5 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
234. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2456.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 2454.
237. See id.
238. See Respondents' Brief at 42, Capitol Square (No. 94-780) ("[T]he State has never
been able to explain why the risk of a mistaken perception of endorsement automatically
exists for unattended religious displays when it does not exist for private unattended dis-
plays of other kinds.").
239. See id. at 43. The Respondents assert that:
[The State's contention] erroneously presumes that reasonable onlookers will au-
tomatically believe that a controversial private symbol, like the Klan cross, is en-
dorsed by the State. In the State's view, the presumption is so strong that no facts
are sufficient to overcome the mistaken belief. This contention devalues the right
of a speaker to display unattended religious symbols on a public forum, even
when there is no evidence of an Establishment Clause violation.
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Justice Souter, in his concurrence, declared that he would retain the
endorsement test.24° He criticized the plurality for creating a "serious
loophole" in the endorsement test.241 The only "loophole" he suggests,
however, is the possibility that the government may manipulate neutral
policies to encourage private parties to flood public forums with religious
displays.242 This argument fails for the same reason Justice O'Connor's
argument fails.2 43 Such manipulation would constitute favoritism and
preference, undoubtedly prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 2 "
C. The Ramifications of the Public Forum Exception
Ideally, the plurality opinion in Capitol Square could provide much
needed clarity to the lower courts with respect to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.245 The plurality's public forum approach sends a clear
message that private religious expression in a traditional public forum
does not violate the Establishment Clause.246 Such a message should re-
duce Establishment Clause litigation.247 It is unfortunate, however, that
the public forum exception to the endorsement test did not receive more
than a plurality approval from the Court.248 Where the endorsement test
Id.
240. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2461 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter
stated that "[e]ven if precedent and practice were otherwise ... and there were an open
question about applying the endorsement test to private speech in public forums, I would
apply it in preference to the plurality's view, which creates a serious loophole in the protec-
tion provided by the endorsement test." Id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's hy-
pothesis of government favoritism toward religion through neutral policies).
244. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448-49 (plurality opinion); see also supra note
223 (discussing Professor McConnell's assertion that the endorsement test should be ap-
plied only where the government engages in outright favoritism or preference of religion,
not where potential endorsement exists).
245. See Leading Cases, supra note 192, at 178 ("Bright-line rules possess two advan-
tages that are particularly compelling in the Establishment Clause context: they are easy to
understand and administer, and they are less susceptible to manipulation according to the
preferences of individual judges and justices.").
246. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450.
247. See Leading Cases, supra note 192, at 178 & n.72. This article asserts that the
Court should heed the plurality's public forum exception to the endorsement test because
the test's clarity alerts litigants and courts as to where and when the Establishment Clause
has been violated. See id.
248. See Harvey Berkman & Marcia Coyle, A Fractious Court Remains Divided Over
Religion, NAT'L. L.J., July 10, 1995, at A14 (stating that the variety of opinions expressed in
Capitol Square is more "likely to provoke rather than quell litigation"); see also Gross-
baum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581, 594 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
no risk of an Establishment Clause violation where a private religious display was given
access to government property made available for non-governmental, private expression,
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has proved inconsistent in application and result, public forum analysis
can offer more rigid guidelines for assessing the constitutionality of pri-
vate religious expression in a traditional public forum located near the
seat of government. If the lower courts accept the plurality's rationale,
then they must find that private, symbolic, religious expression in a tradi-
tional public forum located at the seat of government does not violate the
Establishment Clause.249 If, however, lower courts choose to continue to
apply the endorsement test, then, depending on whether they agree with
Justice O'Connor's or Justice Stevens' definition of the reasonable ob-
server (or perhaps another definition), the potential outcomes are far less
predictable.25° Under the endorsement test, private, religious, symbolic
speech ultimately could be subordinated to secular symbolic speech. 5'
Finally, the plurality opinion in Capitol Square also allows states to
keep their neutral policies relating to symbolic speech and access to tradi-
tional public fora in place without worrying about implementing modifi-
cations for religious symbolic speech, or worse yet, banning symbolic
speech altogether.252
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette reached a significant decision regarding private religious expres-
sion in public fora located at the seat of government. The Court correctly
decided that private religious speech in a public forum located at the seat
of government is worthy of the same protection as secular speech. Fur-
thermore, the plurality established an important exception to the en-
dorsement test by refusing to apply the test to private speech. The
plurality's rationale is consistent with prior case law establishing that neu-
but stating that "recent Supreme Court cases [referring to Capitol Square] fail to give us
definitive guidance on the appropriate assessment of the 'seat of government'
consideration").
249. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct at 2450.
250. See supra note 30 (noting lower court cases similar in fact where violations were
found in some instances, but not in others).
251. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449. The plurality asserts that the transferred
endorsement test the concurring justices proposed would "exile[ ] private religious speech
to a realm of less-protected expression heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit dis-
plays and commercial speech." Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 6, at 248-49. Robertson
asks, "Because the Establishment Clause limits only government action, how can it provide
reason to banish citizens' religious speech from public property?" Id. at 248. He argues
that the endorsement test is premised on a strictly "secularist view of the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 249. This view, he asserts, requires a detrimental separation between pri-
vate religious expression and government, and imposes Establishment Clause restrictions
belonging to the government upon private citizens. See id.
252. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449.
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tral state policies that incidentally benefit religion do not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. This rationale also safeguards an individual's First
Amendment rights of Free Speech and Free Expression of Religion.
Christine Mary Richardson
